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Introduction 
This paper focuses on monetary and exchange rates policies. It presents the policies implemented in 
Argentina in the nineties and in the period that followed the collapse of the convertibility regime. 
Then, as a way of deriving useful lessons from the analyses of the Argentine experience, we present 
a macroeconomic policy regime proposal partially based on the recent Argentine experience but able 
to be implemented in more general contexts and circumstances.  
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section analyzes the convertibility regime period. 
The second section is focused on the policies and the macroeconomic performance in the more 
recent period, from the 2001 crisis to present times. The third section presents a macroeconomic 
regime proposal with a stable and competitive real exchange rate (SCRER) as an intermediate target. 
This alternative to the inflation targeting regime is based to a great extent on the stylized facts of the 
recent exchange and monetary policies in Argentina. Some conclusions are presented in the fourth 
section. A brief survey of the main measures and events from 2000 on is presented at the end of the 
paper (the Chronological Appendix).  
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1. The Convertibility Regime1  
In March 1991 the Convertibility Law was sanctioned. It established fixed peso-dollar parity and 
validated contracts in foreign currencies. It also stipulated that the central bank must back 100 
percent of its monetary base with foreign reserves. By September 1992, the new Central Bank Law 
set narrow margins to the possibilities of purchasing public bonds and lending to the commercial 
banks. The new law also established the autonomy of the central bank.  
This novel monetary arrangement was the pillar of a broader stabilization program and was intended 
to take the economy away from the high inflation regime, settled since the mid-seventies, which had 
led to two brief hyperinflationary episodes in 1989 and 1990 (see Figure 1.1). The program included, 
from early 1991, an almost complete liberalization of trade flows2 and the full deregulation of the 
capital account of the balance of payments. It was jointly applied with an impressive process of 
market-friendly reforms, targeting the privatization of a large proportion of state-owned enterprises.3 
FIGURE 1.1 
Inflation Rates (Quarterly Data, in Percent) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on INDEC. 
                                                 
1 For an extensive treatment of the macroeconomic regime, labor market, and income distribution evolution under the 
convertibility regime, see Damill, Frenkel and Maurizio (2002). 
2 In fact, a gradual commercial liberalization program had already begun in 1988. However, in the nineties, the opening 
process was accelerated. Average import tariffs were reduced from 26.5% in October 1989 to 9.7% in April 1991. In 
addition, specific duties were eliminated, as were quantitative restrictions on imports. Only special tariffs for a reduced 
group of articles (including motor vehicles and electronics) and restrictions for 25 tariff items were maintained. 
3 Privatizations commenced in 1990 with the transfer of the telephone company and the national airlines. By late 1994 
the major part of the state-owned firms producing goods and services had been sold, including the most important 
ones: the oil company (YPF) and the producers and distributors of electric power. In some cases (oil fields, railways, 
ports, highways, waterworks and sewage, and television channels and radio stations), the government resorted to the 
privatization of the management. 
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In practice, the Convertibility Law transformed the central bank into a currency board. The legal 
monetary framework left little room for the central bank to finance the government and banks, and 
to carry out other financial operations. This feature was especially important for the setting of the 
essential mechanisms of the new macroeconomic regime. In effect, the legal constraints on the 
central bank’s ability to autonomously manage the monetary base left domestic credit and liquidity 
almost fully dependent on the balance of payments results. Central bank reserve accumulation led to 
an endogenous expansion of the monetary base and the banking system credits, and fostered 
domestic demand. On the other hand, international reserves contractions automatically resulted in 
reductions of the monetary base and credit, inducing recession (Figure 1.2). 
FIGURE 1.2 
Evolution of Money, Domestic Credit, and International Reserves in Real Terms  
(Deflated by CPI, 1991=1) 
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*  Including dollar deposits in local banks. 
** Central Bank and bank reserves, excluding public sector deposits in the Central Bank.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Central Bank data. 
 
Besides the above mentioned legal and policy framework, there are two other aspects that should be 
underlined as crucial characteristics of the economic settings of the convertibility period. Firstly, the 
real exchange rate was already appreciated when the nominal exchange rate was pegged to the dollar 
in March 1991 and this appreciated level lasted throughout the nineties (see Figure 1.3). There was 
an important increment in the manufacturing sector’s labor productivity, but the average unit labor 
cost in constant dollars did not fall because non-tradable goods and services’ prices and nominal 
wages rose in the first half of the nineties. Fluctuations in the multilateral real exchange rate around 
the trend were mainly caused by exchange rate fluctuations in trade partner countries, particularly in 
Brazil. The appreciation accentuated after the Brazilian devaluation in 1999.  
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FIGURE 1.3 
Bilateral Real Exchange Rate with the United States* (Second semester 1986 = 1) 
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02  
* Calculated using U.S. and Argentina Consumer Price Indices. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Central Bank, Ministry of Economy, and US Bureau of Labor Statistics data. 
 
Secondly, despite the high credibility enjoyed for a long time by the exchange rate commitment (as 
measured, for instance, by the interest rate differentials), private sector savers have shown 
preference for dollar-denominated deposits while banks hedged their balance sheets against 
exchange rate risk by offering dollar-denominated credits. Consequently, as from the early steps of 
the convertibility regime, there was a persistent trend towards a growing proportion of dollar-
denominated assets and liabilities in the local banking system. This proportion grew to over 60% in 
the last years of the regime. The dollarization of local savings and credits played an important role in 
agents’ perceptions and behavior. The dollarization of private sector assets was perceived as a hedge 
against the risk of devaluation and thus contributed to the reduction of the volatility of local 
portfolios and enabled extension of the maturity of contracts. Throughout these effects it has also 
contributed to lengthen the survival of the convertibility regime. This last role was particularly 
important after the Asian and Russian-Brazilian crises. While there was a dramatic run from local 
deposits in the crisis that followed the Mexican devaluation, total deposits in the banking system 
remained strong until 1998-99, and only started to fall by late 2000. On the other hand, the burden 
of exchange risk rested not only on foreign investors — and banks and big firms indebted abroad — 
but also on numerous local bank debtors with peso- denominated income. 
The appreciated exchange rate and the partial dollarization of the local banking system were not 
necessary ingredients of a currency board regime. They arose from specific local circumstances, but 
both constituted basic characteristics of the convertibility regime and significantly influenced its 
performance and dramatic breakdown. 
The convertibility regime succinctly described above was an extremely rigid setting. The rigidity did 
not follow exclusively from the legal rules but also from the actual behavior of the markets. For 
instance, the flexibility of the real exchange rate vis-à-vis negative external shocks would have 
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required a significant downward flexibility of domestic non-tradable goods’ prices. Actually, no 
significant nominal deflation took place either in the 1995 recession or in the post-1998 depression 
(see Figure 1.1), in spite of the significant flexibility of low-skilled wages. Nominal downward rigidity 
of prices of non-tradable goods and services arises from a number of reasons that we do not have 
room to discuss here. Let us simply say that labor market legislation played, at most, a minor role in 
this regard. 
The convertibility regime setting determined two features of the macroeconomic performance. 
Firstly, there was a growing external gap. The combination of trade opening with the appreciated 
exchange rate resulted in a chronic trade balance deficit. The trade balance reached equilibrium or 
surplus only under conditions of deep recession. The trade deficit together with the growing 
structural deficit in the factor services account generated a rising current account deficit (see Figure 
1.4). To sustain any positive rate of growth, the economy needed substantial and increasing external 
capital inflows. 
FIGURE 1.4 
Balance of Payments (Four Quarters Monthly Average, in Millions of Dollars) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy data. 
 
Up to a certain point, the currency board regime played its intended role as an automatic stabilizer of 
the external accounts. But in the convertibility regime, the deepest recessions left the current 
account with a substantial deficit and a very high unemployment rate (see Figure 1.5). These features 
weighed on the negative side of international investors’ perceptions and tended to compensate for 
its positive side. The Argentine version of the currency board was far from dissipating the risk of 
default. 
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FIGURE 1.5 
Unemployment (U) and Involuntary Underemployment (IU), as a Percent of Urban Active Population 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on INDEC data. 
 
Secondly, the volatility of the international financial conditions confronted by the country was 
mechanically transmitted to the domestic activity and employment levels. The correlation between 
national performance and the behavior of international capital markets is a common characteristic of 
the emerging market economies, but in the Argentine case the correlation was accentuated by the 
convertibility regime because it lacked any significant monetary and nominal flexibility to 
compensate for external impulses of both directions.  
The Argentine macroeconomic experience under the convertibility regime is an example of a more 
general pattern of external crises. Many of the crises that took place since the seventies followed a 
boom-and-bust cycle path, generated by significant capital inflows to small and badly regulated 
domestic financial systems, in fixed (or semi-fixed) exchange rate environments.4  The stylized 
features of this cycle can be described as the following.  It begins with an expansionary phase caused 
by capital inflows typically attracted by high interest rate differentials between local and foreign 
assets in contexts of credible fixed exchange rates. Domestic credit and aggregate demand 
expansions follow. Real exchange rate appreciation emerges as a consequence of inflation generated 
by demand pressures, residual price increments (in cases of exchange rate stabilization programs5), 
or both. The current account worsens as a result of the increasing net imports flow caused by both 
the exchange rate appreciation and the demand expansion. The external financial needs then rise and 
lead to debt accumulation. Consequently, external vulnerability of the economy progressively 
increases. As the perceived risk increases, capital inflows tend to slow down and interest rates rise, 
                                                 
4 A formal model, inspired by the Argentine and Chilean experiences in the late seventies-early eighties can be found in 
Frenkel (1983). English versions are presented in Taylor (1991 and 2004) and Williamson (1983). Asian and Latin 
American crises in the nineties analyzed in this vein are discussed by Taylor (1998) and Frenkel (2003a). 
5 This was a typical result of this kind of stabilization programs that were implemented in Latin America in the seventies 
and in the early nineties.  
Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2007 • 7 
 
pushed by rising country risk and exchange risk premiums. Reserve accumulation reaches a 
maximum, and a second contractionary phase begins. Capital outflows and higher interest rates give 
place to an illiquid and insolvent financial scenario a la Minsky (1975). The rise in the real interest 
rate, an endogenous consequence of increasing external fragility, sharpens the contraction of 
economic activity, creating additional sources of financial tensions. Finally, the exchange rate regime 
collapses simultaneously with a financial crisis.  
The path of the Argentina’s economy under convertibility and the consequent 2001-2002 crisis is a 
clear example of this kind of cyclical dynamic.6 The main stylized facts of this pattern were observed 
twice during the decade. The macroeconomic performance of the 1991-95 period clearly fit the 
stylized cycle just described. The speculative growth, led by capital inflows, lasted until 1994. In early 
1994 the Federal Reserve in the U.S. started to increase the short-term interest rates, affecting 
international capital inflows negatively and causing foreign reserves to stop growing, because of the 
continuously increasing deficit in the current account. Then, the contagion of the Mexican crisis of 
December 1994 triggered a massive capital outflow at the beginning of 1995, with a sharp increase in 
the country risk premium and the interest rates. Foreign reserves fell and a contraction ensued.  
However, the convertibility regime was successfully preserved and the recession of mid-nineties was 
short-lived. Owing to the favorable effects of the external financial support led by the IMF, it was 
possible to preserve the exchange rate and monetary regime, and in late 1995 a new expansion was 
already starting. The elements of the cyclical dynamics were in motion once again. The expansion 
phase that followed showed similar stylized facts to the first, although this time it was shorter.7  The 
country-risk premium jumped in mid-1997, after the devaluation in Thailand. Then, after the 
Russian crisis of 1998, a new contraction started.  
Given the legal inability to pursue a counter-cyclical monetary policy, the government had to rest on 
fiscal and supply side policies to deal with the depression. First, the Menem Administration, and 
since December 1999 the new one led by De la Rúa, tried to reverse the contractionary trend 
through several fiscal tightening programs. In their view, the main cause of the economic depression 
was not the exchange rate appreciation and the external and financial vulnerability, but fiscal 
mismanagement. Fiscal discipline would entail stronger confidence, and consequently the risk 
premium would fall and bring interest rates down. Therefore, domestic expenditure would recover 
and push the economy out of the recession. Lower interest rates and an increased GDP would, in 
turn, re-establish a balanced budget, and thus close a virtuous circle.  
However, with the economy locked inside an external debt trap, the ‘confidence shock’ did not help 
to revert the trend. Moreover, the rounds of contractionary fiscal policies only reinforced the 
                                                 
6 For an extensive treatment of the macroeconomic dynamic and the crisis, see Damill and Frenkel (2003). 
7 Beyond the similarities, the second cycle of the nineties differed from the first one in many respects. We mention one 
of them: During the first economic expansion private inflows were predominant despite the privatization of the most 
important state-owned companies that took place in that period. In contrast, the second expansion was bolstered 
mainly by capital inflows directed to the national government that issued greater foreign debt than its external needs. 
Meanwhile, net capital inflows directed to the private sector recovered slowly and, from mid-1998 onward, they 
stopped flowing in important amounts. An abrupt outflow started in late 2000. Thus, during the second cycle, the 
public sector played a crucial role in the financing of the reserves accumulation and, through the monetary channel 
explained above, in the economic expansion. Instead, the private sector proved to be a net demander of foreign 
currency. For a detailed explanation see Damill (2000). 
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deflationary dynamics and pessimistic expectations. Besides some initiatives on the financial front,8 
divergent processes occurred (i.e. the withdrawal of bank deposits and the contraction of 
international reserves). Finally, in December 2001, the government established hard restrictions on 
capital movements and on the retirements of cash from banks (the so-called “corralito”). The 
purposes of the measures were to avoid either the generalized bankruptcy of the banks or the 
violation of the currency board’s monetary rule. But the main objectives of the measures were to 
hold back the demand for foreign currency, to preserve the stock of reserves, and to avoid 
devaluation (i.e. the formal abandonment of the convertibility regime). It was also the last drastic 
move attempting to prevent the default. Yet, the measures actually did represent the end of the 
regime. 
The measures of December 2001 contributed to deepening the already strong social and political 
tensions. After a few days of social unrest and political commotion, the country witnessed the 
resignation of the government followed by a series of ephemeral presidents. One of these 
announced to the Congress the decision of defaulting on a portion of the public debt, and resigned a 
few days later. In the first days of 2002, with a new president, Argentina officially abandoned the 
currency board regime and the one-to-one parity of the peso to the U.S. dollar. 
Before ending this section, it is worth emphasizing once more the important influence of the 
monetary arrangement on the macroeconomic behavior of Argentina under the convertibility 
regime. The monetary rule imposed by the Convertibility Law prevented the central bank from 
conducting an autonomous management of the monetary base. The balance of payments’ outcome 
endogenously determined domestic credit and liquidity, while the ‘floor’ of the domestic interest rate 
was set by the international rate plus the country risk premium. This lack of monetary autonomy was 
the consequence of the conjunction of deliberate legal constraints on the central bank’s degrees of 
freedom and the full opening of the capital account. 
 
                                                 
8 Since taking office, the government achieved three financial agreements with the IMF and also launched two important 
‘voluntary’ debt swaps in the second half of 2001. 
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2.  The Post‐Convertibility Macroeconomic Regime and 
Performance 
The convertibility regime was abandoned in the midst of a chaotic situation. The massive flight to 
external assets that precipitated the collapse of the regime accelerated after the devaluation of the 
peso and the default. The government decided to replace the currency board with a dual exchange 
rate regime, maintaining the exchange controls and the ‘corralito’. The foreign exchange (FX) 
market was split in two segments: an official market for certain trade and financial operations with a 
fixed parity of 1.40 pesos per dollar, and a floating rate market open to the rest of foreign exchange 
operations. Soon after, the IMF let the new administration know that there would be no 
negotiations with the country while the dual exchange rate regime and the controls were maintained. 
Then, the government decided to unify the FX market and let the peso float. Once the local 
currency started to float, the parity rose abruptly and after a few months reached levels close to 4 
pesos per dollar in an environment of expectations of further increases in the price of the dollar. 
The overshooting led to a rise in local prices. Although the pass-through was low in comparison to 
other devaluation experiences, four months after the devaluation the CPI inflation evinced a 21% 
increase. This caused an average fall in real wages of almost 18% and a consequent recessionary 
impulse on aggregate demand. 
Contrary to what was expected, the contractionary effect of the devaluation on [financial entities’] 
balance sheets was small, mainly as a consequence of the official intervention. When the FX market 
was unified and the exchange rate was freed to float, the government decided to convert to pesos 
most domestic debts contracted in dollars (bank credits, rents, etc.) at a $/U.S.$1 rate, thus 
neutralizing most of the effects of relative price change on the debtors’ balance sheets. In contrast, 
banks’ deposits originally denominated in dollars were ‘pesofied’ at 1.40 pesos per dollar (plus 
indexation to the evolution of CPI inflation).9 Together with the ‘pesofication’, the authorities 
unilaterally decided to extend the maturity and duration of all deposits, including those originally 
contracted in pesos. In exchange, private depositors received certificates for the reprogrammed 
deposits (CEDROS), latter known as the “corralón.” 
Social indicators such as the unemployment rates and the indices of poverty and indigence, which 
had considerably worsened through the nineties, suffered from additional deterioration in this stage, 
mainly as a result in the rise of domestic prices that followed the devaluation (Damill, Frenkel y 
Maurizio, 2003).  
Therefore, the dramatic fall in output and employment continued in the period immediately 
following the end of the convertibility. However, this trend did not last for too long. Only one 
quarter after the devaluation and default, the recovery was already underway. At this time most of 
the analysts — including the IMF’s staff — were expecting a hyperinflation process led by the 
overshooting of the exchange rate and the continuation of the contractionary trend.  
                                                 
9  Later on, the government issued new debt to compensate the banks for the balance sheet effect of the asymmetric 
‘pesofication’.  
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Since the second quarter of 2002, GDP has been growing at a 7.9% average annual rate, and by mid-
2005 it had surpassed the historical maximum level reached in 1998 (Figure 2.1). The recovery was 
bolstered by the shift in the relative prices and also by the adequate set of policies that, despite its 
flaws and ambiguities, nevertheless succeeded in stabilizing the FX market and domestic prices and 
in recuperating the basic macroeconomic equilibria. Favorable external conditions, such as high 
international commodities prices and low international interest rates, also contributed to this 
process. In the following subsections we analyze the principal features of the macroeconomic 
performance of Argentina in the post-convertibility period.  
FIGURE 2.1 
Seasonally Adjusted GDP, in Millions of Pesos of 1993 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy data. 
 
2.1 The Main Characteristics of the Economic Recovery  
The path of economic recovery can be divided into three periods. In the first one, comprising the 
second and third quarters of 2002, the GDP expansion was weak and rested on international trade 
variables stimulated by the real depreciation. Domestic absorption (particularly, private 
consumptions and investment) continued to shrink, as happened during the previous depression, 
though at a slow pace. Therefore, it was not aggregate demand that stopped the decline in the 
activity level. In effect, the continuing fall in employment and real wages,10 the liquidity constraints 
generated by the ‘corralito’ and ‘corralón’, and the high uncertainty on the future values of the 
principal financial variables imposed important limitations on the recuperation of private 
consumption and investment expenditures. Table 2.1 (below) shows the contraction of aggregate 
demand components in this period. It also shows that exports, and especially import substitution, 
were the expansive factors. Favored by the change in relative prices, local production started to 
provide an increasing proportion of aggregate demand.  
                                                 
10 Although at a much slower pace, both real wages and employment continued to fall during this period.  
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TABLE 2.1 
GDP and Aggregate Demand Components: Variation Rates and Contribution to GDP Variation, in Percent 
  GDP Private 
Consumption
Public 
Consumption
Investment Exports Imports Net Exports Domestic 
Absorption1 
Net Domestic 
Absorption2 
Variation in Period  1.0 -1.4 -1.7 -7.3 3.0 -5.9 10.6 0.2 0.6 
Annual Average Variation  2.0 -2.7 -3.3 -14.1 6.1 -11.5 22.4 0.4 1.3 
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0
2
:
0
1
 
t
o
 
2
0
0
2
:
0
3
 
Contribution to GDP 
Variation 
100.0 -93.4 -24.9 -88.5 43.3 39.1 82.4 17.6 56.7 
Variation in Period  16.4 17.3 4.4 86.3 5.1 96.8 -61.2 23.5 18.3 
Annual Average Variation  9.1 9.6 2.5 42.7 2.9 47.2 -41.8 12.8 10.1 
2
0
0
2
:
0
3
 
t
o
 
2
0
0
4
:
0
2
 
Contribution to GDP 
Variation 
100.0 68.9 3.8 56.9 4.4 -35.3 -30.9 130.9 95.6 
Variation in Period  9.0 10.8 4.9 24.7 22.3 28.9 -2.0 9.3 7.0 
Annual Average Variation  9.0 10.8 4.9 24.7 22.3 28.9 -2.0 9.3 7.0 
2
0
0
4
:
0
2
 
t
o
 
2
0
0
5
:
0
2
 
Contribution to GDP 
Variation 
100.0 79.4 6.9 47.7 32.0 -32.6 -0.6 100.6 68.0 
 Annual Average 
Variation 7.9 8.0 2.3 26.2 9.0 30.7 -23.4 9.7 7.7 
1 Includes the variation of stocks and statistical discrepancy. 
2 Equal to domestic absorption – imports. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Economy data. 
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It is remarkable that this phase started while the country was still immersed in a context of 
accentuated financial instability and political uncertainty despite the short-term contractionary 
effects of the depreciation still in motion. It is especially notable that the recuperation took 
place while financial variables were following a divergent path. As we show in the next section, 
the nominal and real depreciation, the withdrawal of bank deposits, the capital flight, the 
erosion of international reserves, and the rise in the domestic interest rates were still taking 
place when the third quarter of 2002 started. 
After this short initial stage a second period began. Along this phase, the recovery was led by 
the increase in the domestic demand components. The normalization of the behavior of the 
financial variables along the third quarter of 2002 certainly helped to create a more stable 
environment, so that the private sector could take advantage of the opportunities unfolding by 
the change in relative prices. Domestic absorption grew at a 12.8% annual rate and explained 
more than the entire rise of GDP in this period. On the other hand, net exports started to 
operate as a contractionary force, mainly because of the rapid recuperation of imports but also 
due to the weak performance of exports. 
Private consumption showed an important dynamism, growing at a 9.6% average annual rate 
between the third quarter of 2002 and the second of 2004, and explained 69% of the GDP 
growth in the period (see Table 2.1). Several factors accounted for this performance. Among 
them, the launching in the second semester of 2002 of an unemployment subsidy program (the 
so-called ‘Plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar Desocupados’) should be underlined. It provided income 
to some 1.8 million beneficiaries. Secondly, after an important downturn of around 25%, real 
wages started to recover after the fourth quarter of 2002, as a consequence of both the 
deceleration of inflation and the rise in nominal wages. After reaching a peak in April 2002, 
inflation started to slow down, and since the end of that year the monthly inflation rate tended 
to be lower than 1% for the subsequent two years (see Figure 2.2). The improvement in 
nominal wages was associated with a rapid fall in unemployment, and was also helped by an 
official policy consisting in several lump-sum rises in private sector wages determined by 
decree during 2002-04 (Frenkel, 2004a).  
The fall in the unemployment rate was due to the important recuperation in full-time 
employment favored not only by the economic expansion but also by the real exchange 
depreciation. As we discuss below, there is significant evidence showing that a depreciated or 
competitive real exchange rate tends to increase the labor intensity of output, given a certain 
activity level or growth rate. So, the employment recuperation stimulated private consumption 
through two effects: on the one hand, by increasing the number of wage-earners, and on the 
other, by contributing to the rise in real wages.    
Lastly, it should also be mentioned that the devaluation had a positive wealth effect on the 
private sector’s foreign asset holdings. These assets —  now surpassing 120 billion dollars — 
increased their value in relation to domestic goods and assets such as real estate and land. 
Investment showed an amazing dynamism, growing at a 42.7% annual rate along this second 
phase and contributing 57% to GDP growth (see Table 2.1). This behavior is in part a result of 
the gradual normalization of the financial environment. However, it should be stressed that 
such a recovery took place in a context of accentuated credit rationing, both external and 
internal. The investment was apparently financed by higher profits retained by firms. The 
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‘wealth effect’ resulting from the significant external asset holdings of the private resident 
sector mentioned above may have contributed as well. This effect is the principal factor behind 
the rapid expansion of both residential and corporate construction, in light of the lack of bank 
credit during this period. The construction activity explained 56% of the increment in 
investment during this second phase. The other 44% was due to investment in capital goods, 
especially those imported, which grew 310% between the third quarter of 2002 and the second 
quarter of 2004. 
FIGURE 2.2 
Yearly Inflation Rate (Left Axis) and Monthly Inflation Rate (Right Axis), in Percent 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on INDEC data. 
 
Finally, the effect of net exports on the economic recovery was contractionary in this second 
period (see Table 2.1). This basically resulted from the recuperation of imports, which nearly 
doubled in only five quarters. As we mentioned above, the demand for foreign capital 
equipment was one of the major elements in this rapid recovery, together with those imports 
serving as intermediate inputs. On the other hand, exports reduced their rate of growth. 
Despite this behavior of exports and imports, the important trade surplus generated by the 
2001-02 crisis remained virtually unchanged. 
From the third quarter of 2004 on, exports started a speedy expansion at a 22% annual rate, 
giving birth to a third phase in the economic recovery process. Throughout this new phase, 
economic growth has maintained momentum, but in contrast to the previous period it has 
rested not only on the above commented expansion of domestic demand but also on exports’ 
dynamism. As Table 2.1 shows, two thirds of the GDP expansion during this stage is explained 
by domestic demand of local production (see the last column of the table) and the other third 
by exports. The official strategy consisting of preserving a competitive exchange rate is surely a 
crucial factor behind the export upturn. The lag in the reaction of exports to the new set of 
relative prices does not differ from other international experiences, such as Brazil after the 
1999 devaluation. It seems reasonable that tradable firms required time to take advantage of 
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the competitive RER, in order to re-orient their production and to establish commercialization 
channels abroad.  
By mid-2005 the GDP surpassed its pre-crisis level and what initially started  a recuperation 
process became an economic growth process. As we write, the activity continues to expand at 
an impressive speed of approximately 9%. It is important to note that the current process 
presents significant differences with other economic growth episodes in Argentina’s economic 
history. In contrast to the traditional fiscal and external imbalances, the current 
macroeconomic configuration stands out with the existence of external and fiscal surpluses.  
The improvement in the Consolidated Public Sector fiscal balances (i.e. including the 
provinces’ balances) that took place between 2001 and 2004 was impressive: equivalent to 9.2 
points of GDP (see Table 2.2). The balance passed from a global deficit of 5.6% of GDP in 
2001, to a 3.6% surplus in 2004. The main factors explaining the fiscal adjustment were the 
following: almost 40% of it was derived from an improvement in the provinces’ balances, 
which was caused by the increase in tax collection (facilitated by the economic recovery and 
the rise in nominal prices) together with the expenditure restraints. The National 
Administration contributed the other 60% of the adjustment. Two factors were especially 
relevant. The contraction of interest payments, basically resulting from the partial default on 
sovereign debt, was one of them (-2.5% of GDP).11 The other was the implementation of taxes 
on exports immediately after devaluation jointly with the maintenance of the tax on financial 
operations established in 2001 (+2.7% of GDP). The revenues generated by these two taxes 
were equivalent to almost the entire national primary surplus in 2004. Thus, the public sector 
captured part of the devaluation effect on the profitability of the tradable goods sector, and has 
also benefited from the high prices reached by some of the exportable goods, like soy and oil. 
On the other hand, the adjustment of the external accounts started well before the devaluation. 
The improvement in the current account started in 1998, led by the contraction of imports due 
to economic depression. Despite the interest payments’ increment of almost US$2.4 billion, 
the current account’s deficit was reduced by more than US$10.7 billion between 1998 and 2001 
(see Table 2.3). During the post-convertibility period, there was an additional adjustment of 
nearly 7 billions dollars. It is interesting to compare the 1998 and 2004 results because GDP 
was almost at the same level12 in those years, while RER levels were dramatically different. The 
US$17.5 billion improvement in the current account is attributable, to a great extent, to the real 
devaluation. In the whole period, the trade balance showed an impressive US$19.1 billion 
improvement, resulting from both the expansion of exports (US$8.2 billion) and the reduction 
of imports (US$10.9 billion). When interest arrears (US$5.5 billion) resulting from the default 
on private and public external debt are taken into account, the improvement in the current 
account ascends to US$23 billion.  
                                                 
11  It is important to notice that the fiscal effects of the suspension of part of the debt services payments were 
significantly higher than what is shown in the mentioned account because of the dollarization of public debt. It 
cannot be calculated with precision because a significant amount of new debt was issued after the suspension of 
debt payments. However it can be estimated that the amount of interest expenditures on the public debt — 
valued at the 2004 exchange rate — would have represented in that year between 9 and 11 points of GDP. This 
is approximately equivalent to half of the total tax revenues. These payments certainly would have been 
incompatible with the economic recovery.  
12 In fact, average GDP in 1998 was 3.2% higher than the average in 2004. 
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TABLE 2.2 
Fiscal adjustment: Results of the Consolidated Public Sector (CPS), as a Percentage of GDP 
  Change 
  
1998 2001 2004 
2001-2004 1998-2004 
Total Receipts 18.9% 18.8% 23.5% 4.7pp 4.6pp 
  Tax Receipts 13.5 13.8 18.7 4.9 5.2 
    Financial Tax1 0.0 1.1 1.5 0.4 1.5 
    Tax on Exports 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 
    Other Taxes 13.5 12.7 14.9 2.2 1.4 
  Other Receipts 5.4 4.9 4.8 -0.1 -0.6 
Total Expenditures 20.3 22.0 20.9 -1.1 0.6 
  Primary Expend. 18.0 18.2 19.6 1.4 1.6 
    Capital Expend. 1.3 1.0 1.3 0.3 0.0 
  Interest Services 2.2 3.8 1.3 -2.5 -1.0 
NPS Primary Result 0.9 0.5 3.9 3.3 3.0 N
at
io
na
l P
ub
lic
 S
ec
to
r (
N
PS
) 
NPS Total Result -1.4 -3.2 2.6 5.9 4.0 
Provinces Primary Result -0.3 -1.5 1.4 2.8 1.6 
Pr
ov
. 
Provinces Total Result -0.7 -2.4 1.0 3.4 1.6 
CPS Primary Result 0.6 -0.9 5.2 6.2 4.6 
C
PS
 
CPS Total Result -2.0 -5.6 3.6 9.2 5.6 
1 Tax on bank debits and credits. 
Source: Authors´ calculations based on Ministry of Economy. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.3 
External adjustment: Current Account of Balance of Payments, in Billions of Dollars) 
 Change 
 
1998 2001 2004 
1998-2001 1998-2004 
Current Account $-14.5 $-3.9 $3.0 $10.7 $17.5 
Trade Balance1 -7.6 3.4 11.5 11.0 19.1 
  Exports 31.2 31.0 39.4 -0.2 8.2 
  Imports 38.8 27.5 27.9 -11.2 -10.9 
Interests -5.1 -7.5 -6.8 -2.4 -1.8 
  Credits 5.3 4.7 2.9 -0.6 -2.3 
  Debits 10.3 12.2 9.8 1.8 -0.6 
Utilities & Incomes -2.3 -0.3 -2.3 2.0 0.0 
  Credits 0.9 0.6 0.6 -0.2 -0.3 
  Debits 3.2 0.9 2.9 -2.3 -0.2 
Other Rents & Transfers 0.5 0.4 0.7 -0.03 0.2 
Interests Arrears - - 5.5    - 5.5 
Current Account + Int. Arrears -14.5 -3.9 8.5 10.7 23.0 
1 Includes goods and services. 
Source: Authors´ calculations based on Ministry of Economy data. 
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2.2 The Evolution of Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies  
The weakening in the demand for local assets had begun by mid-1998. This process took place 
simultaneously with a persistent rise of the country risk premium. However, the divergent 
trends in the domestic financial market that triggered the collapse of the convertibility regime 
only started in October 2000, associated with the political turmoil caused by the Vice-
President’s resignation. The process followed simple dynamics. Expectations of devaluation 
and the perception of a higher risk of default led the public to withdraw deposits and start a 
run against international reserves. There were no bankruptcy reports of failing banks because 
the central bank supported the liquidity of the banking system. As we mentioned in the first 
section, despite several signals issued by the government aiming at changing expectations, the 
intensification of this process could not be stopped. Thus, in the beginning of December, 
restrictions on capital outflows together with the ‘corralito’ were established.  
After the abandonment of the convertibility regime, the government aimed to restrain capital 
flight and stabilize markets by introducing a dual exchange rate regime. The original idea was 
to use this scheme only temporarily, in order to stabilize the nominal exchange rate while 
domestic prices absorbed the impact of the devaluation, and then pass to a floating rate 
regime.  
The decision to unify the FX market and to let the peso float, after the IMF demanded it, 
proved to be inconvenient. Given the situation of the domestic financial system and the high 
uncertainty, a bubble in the exchange rate should have been expected. Indeed, the price of the 
dollar skyrocketed, fed by self-fulfilling expectations.  
It should be noticed that this process developed in an illiquid environment because of the 
‘corralito’ and the ‘corralón’. However, the restriction on the retirements of cash from banks 
was not complete; some relaxations were introduced during January and February 2002. 
Besides, some additional liquidity was generated as a result of judicial decisions. In effect, a 
relevant portion of private savers, affected by the ‘pesofication’ and maturity extension of bank 
deposits, initiated judicial injunctions (‘amparos’), asking for the devolution of their original 
bank deposits in dollars. Several judges ruled the ‘pesofication’ unconstitutional and demanded 
that the banks release the funds. The devolutions of the funds originally deposited in dollars 
were made in pesos at the current exchange rate. With the pesos in their hands, people went to 
the FX market to demand dollars. 
It should also be mentioned that an erratic monetary policy implemented in the first quarter of 
2002 did not help to reverse the divergent trends. It was especially questionable that the 
government delayed the launching of a domestic asset that could perform as a potential 
substitute for dollars. Given the distrust in banks and in the Treasury, the economic depression 
and the growing inflation, the international currency appeared as the only asset available to 
allocate financial assets. It was only two and half months after the devaluation that the central 
bank started to issue papers (the Lebac) in order to supply a financial instrument that could 
compete with the dollar.  
All the mentioned elements contributed to deepening the perverse dynamic of the financial 
variables during the first semester of 2002. The capital flight from domestic assets between 
March 2001 and mid-2002 is described in Figure 2.3. It can be seen that there is a significant 
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fall in private bank deposits13 and that the nominal demand for cash is stagnant, while 
international reserves are dropping substantially. These developments provide evidence for the 
substitution of local assets (cash and deposits) in exchange for external assets (international 
reserves). 
FIGURE 2.3 
Demand for Cash, Central Bank International Reserves*, Lebac, and Private Bank Deposits (right 
axis), in Millions of Pesos and Dollars 
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The result of the asset substitution affected the FX market. The nominal (NER) and real 
exchange rates (RER) rose continuously through the first semester of 2002 (around 260% and 
180%, respectively). Their paths are shown in Figure 2.3. The real exchange rate’s 
overshooting was so pronounced that in June 2002, its value was almost 50% weaker than the 
1980/2001-period average value, and 68% weaker than the convertibility decade average. 
                                                 
13 Figure 2.3 shows a ‘jump’ in the private bank deposit series in January 2002. It reflects the accounting effect of 
the ‘pesofication’ at 1.40 pesos per dollar of deposits issued in foreign currencies, previously valued at a $/U$S 
1 rate. If we put this mere accounting effect aside, it is easy to see the drop in deposits.  
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FIGURE 2.4 
Bilateral Nominal (NER) and Real Exchange Rate (RER)* with the United States, in Pesos  
(Index 1 = December 2001) 
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* Real exchange rate was calculated using U.S. and Argentina Consumer Price Indices. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Central Bank and Ministry of Economy data. 
 
The divergent trends began to converge in July 2002. The turning point was the FX market 
stabilization (see Figure 2.4). This was the result of several factors. Controls on foreign 
exchange transactions were introduced in November 2001, before the convertibility collapse 
(including the obligation to surrender the proceeds from exports in the local FX market), and 
then tightened in March 2002. But it was only since early June 2002, after Roberto Lavagna 
took office as Minister of Economy, that the implementation of controls was strengthened and 
that interventions in the exchange market were reinforced in order to conduct a systematic 
policy intended to stabilize the foreign exchange market. The decision that dollar export 
revenues surpassing US$1 million had to be sold directly to the central bank was especially 
important in this regard.14 This became the main source of dollars for the monetary authority, 
which permitted the authority to increase the volume of its interventions in the foreign 
exchange market. 
Limiting the peso outflow from the banks also helped to restrict the demand for foreign 
currency. In April 2002, the Congress approved the so-called Ley Tapón to ease the pressure 
resulting from the “amparos”. The law modified court procedures and stated that depositors 
would be allowed to access the funds only after the judicial process was concluded; in the 
meantime the funds had to be deposited in an escrow account (thus preserving the liquidity of 
the banking system). However, the law did not completely succeed in stopping the outflow 
                                                 
14 The limit for export surrender then underwent several additional modifications, reducing the minimum to U.$S. 
$200,000 in September 2002. With the normalization of the FX market, the authorities gradually started to raise 
the limit. 
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from banks. It continued until July 2002, when the government issued a decree preventing the 
devolution of deposits stipulated by the “amparos” for 120 days. 
Finally, the local financial market behavior itself contributed to stop the bubble in the 
exchange rate. On the one hand, local interest rates skyrocketed (see Figure 2.5). In July 2002, 
the average time deposit interest rate reached a 76% peak, and the interest rate of the 14-day 
Lebac reached almost 115%. Thus local financial assets began to appear more attractive as 
substitutes for the dollar. On the other hand, as we mentioned above, the real price of the 
dollar reached very high and ‘abnormal’ levels in historical terms (i.e. the prices in dollars of 
domestic assets, non tradable goods and salaries were perceived as abnormally low). In this 
context, once the authorities managed to stop the exchange rate bubble in July, the public 
rapidly changed expectations and the market started to show an appreciation trend.  
FIGURE 2.5 
Interest Rates in Pesos: Lebac (14 and 91 days), Time Deposits (30 to 59 days) and Prime (30 days) 
(Monthly average, in %) 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
14d  Lebac 
91d  Lebac 
Time  Dep o s i t s   3 0 - 5 9 d 
Prime  30d 
E x c h a n g e   R a t e       Stabilization
 
Source: Authors‘ calculations based on Central Bank data. 
 
In the second half of 2002, a phase of normalization of monetary and financial variables 
started. After reaching a peak of almost $/U.S.$4 during the last days of June, the exchange 
rate began to experience a smooth nominal appreciation trend. Although the inflation rate was 
already low and decelerating, the rise in domestic prices contributed to the real appreciation 
(Figure 2.4). In that context, local assets became increasingly attractive. Bank deposits began to 
grow, as did the demand for Lebac, local shares and the demand for cash (Figure 2.3). This 
portfolio substitution in favor of local assets resulted in a persistent drop in interest rates 
(Figure 2.5).   
The financial activity normalization dissipated disrupting expectations and thus allowed the 
above commented second-phase economic recovery, based on the domestic expenditure 
expansion. Interestingly, the recuperation of private expenditure during this phase took place 
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without significant contribution from banks’ credits. Even though the recovery in private 
deposits allowed the recuperation of banks’ liquidity, banks’ extending credit to the private 
sector continued shrinking until late 2003 (see Figure 2.6).  
FIGURE 2.6 
Bank Credit to Private Sector, in Millions of Pesos 
40000 
44000 
48000 
52000 
56000 
60000 
64000 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  
Source: Authors‘ calculations based on Central Bank data. 
 
In this context, domestic expenditure was mainly financed by the private sector’s own savings, 
primarily held in cash. Figure 2.7 shows the increase in cash holding since the fourth quarter of 
2001. Both the monetary base/GDP ratio and the monetary base/total bank deposit ratio 
showed very high rates of growth and also relatively high levels in comparison to the 
convertibility period. Although the low interest rates on banks’ deposits have contributed to 
that performance, this behavior seems to be mainly a persistent consequence of the financial 
crisis. 
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FIGURE 2.7 
Monetary Base in Relation to Total Bank Deposits (Left Axis) and with GDP* (Right Axis), in Percent 
 
* Seasonally adjusted 
Source: Authors´ calculations based on Central Bank and Ministry of Economy data. 
 
The nominal and real appreciation process stopped around mid-2003. This was mainly the 
result of a deliberate policy decision. The preservation of a stable and competitive real 
exchange rate (SCRER) was gaining relevance in the official policy orientation. Nestor 
Kirchner assumed the Presidency in May 2003 and decided to maintain Lavagna as Minister of 
Economy. After a few months, both Kirchner and Lavagna started to make explicit references 
to the importance of preserving a SCRER in the official economic strategy. Although the 
announcements did not identify a specific policy target, the government’s — meaning both the 
Central Bank’s and the Treasury’s — operations in the FX market actually controlled the price 
of the dollar in a range between $ 2.80 and $ 3.05. This exchange rate policy has been 
conducted together with a monetary policy based on quantitative monetary targets, which 
started in 2003. From then on, targets have been announced at the beginning of every year 
through the Central Bank’s monetary programs, in which the authorities commit themselves to 
maintaining monetary aggregates in a certain range. The idea behind this policy is that there is a 
link between monetary aggregates and the inflation rate.15 Since the Central Bank Law states 
that the primary goal of the institution is to pursue low inflation rates,16 monetary policy is 
thus supposed to control the price level indirectly through the management of quantitative 
targets, which are announced in the monetary program every year. Under this policy 
orientation, low inflation rates should be attained not only as a result of the effective monetary 
                                                 
15 This is the rationale of the official orientation. The authors do not share this view. This orientation of monetary 
policy was adopted while the country was under the conditionality of the agreement with the IMF. The 
government accepted this IMF orientation because the issue was considered of second order importance vis-à-
vis other aspects of the agreement.   
16 In fact, the law is somewhat vaguer; it establishes that the Central Bank’s “primary and fundamental mission is 
to preserve the value of the Argentine currency.” 
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expansion but also through the effect of the central bank’s announcement as an inflation 
expectations anchor.  
Although monetary authorities have made explicit declarations about their target being the 
inflation rate, it has been clear for any observer that the central bank has also pursued 
exchange rate targets. This double-target regime was not implemented without difficulties. 
Once the FX market was stabilized by mid-2002, an excess supply of foreign currency 
emerged, generating appreciation pressures. While the central bank had to intervene in the 
foreign exchange market by selling dollars to control the overshooting during the first half of 
2002, immediately afterwards it started to purchase international currency to slow the 
appreciation trend. Given the previous illiquid context and the rapid economic recovery, the 
monetary base’s expansion due to these interventions was at first easily absorbed by the private 
sector, which showed an abnormal liquidity preference after the crises, as we have already 
shown above. But gradually the authorities began to fear the effects of the speedy monetary 
expansion on inflation and therefore decided to decelerate it.17  Hence, in 2003 the Central 
Bank started to face more openly the situation of dealing with two “potentially conflicting” 
objectives: the preservation of a competitive exchange rate by intervening in the FX market 
and at the same time the attainment of the strict targets for monetary expansion announced in 
the monetary program.  
Table 2.4 shows the sources of variation of the monetary base. It accounts for the “tensions” 
in the simultaneous implementation of monetary and exchange rate policies. It can be seen that 
after a rapid growth in the monetary base during the second half of 2002, it follows a gradual 
deceleration in the following two years and finally a contraction in the first half of 2005. The 
table also shows the increasing intervention in the FX market to preserve the exchange rate 
target. The conjunction of increasing money creation, caused by the interventions in the FX 
market, and a decelerating monetary base growth (or even contraction) was made possible 
through several mechanisms. During 2003, the sterilization operations implemented by the 
issuing of central bank letters (Lebac) and notes (Nobac) were especially relevant, neutralizing 
almost 75% of the “excess”18 of monetary expansion caused by the intervention in the FX 
market.  
                                                 
17 The decision of slowing the rate of expansion of the monetary base was not exclusively attributable to a 
decision of central bank authorities. In the successive agreements signed with the IMF, the staff of the IMF 
pushed for the implementation of restrictive quantitative targets on the monetary base growth.  
18 We define “excess” as the difference between the monetary expansion caused by central bank interventions in 
the FX market and the effective monetary base variation. Since the Central Bank has to address the quantitative 
target announced in the monetary program, the defined variable gives an approximation of the sterilization 
needs. It also accounts for the “tensions” in the conduction of the “dual-target” regime.  
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TABLE 2.4 
Sources of Variation of Monetary Base (Monthly Average, in Millions of Pesos and Dollars) 
 
Assistance 
to the 
Treasury 
Assistance 
to Banks 
Central 
Bank FX 
Intervention
Central Bank 
Lebac and 
Nobac Others 
Monetary 
Base 
Variation 
“Excess” of 
Monetary 
Expansion1 
Treasury FX 
Intervention2 
2002:013 $124 $1,426 $-1,450 $-216 $522 $406 $-1,856 N/A 
2002:024 250 86 1,281 -270 327 1,674 -393 N/A 
2003 -52 -125 1,374 -420 32 809 565 28 
2004 -543 -601 1,931 -323 28 493 1,438 112 
2005:01 -70 -807 2,166 -1,319 -146 -176 2,342 535 
1 See footnote 18. 
2 In U.S. dollars. 
3 Calculated for the period February-June 2002. 
4 Omitted is a cancellation of a Banco Nación rediscount by the Treasury with assistance of the Central Bank 
in September 2002 for about $ 3,500 million.  
Source: Authors´ calculation based on Central Bank data. 
 
The need for sterilization increased during 2004. The Central Bank could reduce the issuing of 
Lebac and Nobac because other compensatory mechanisms began to operate. In the first 
place, as liquidity grew the banks started to service the debt incurred with the Central Bank 
during the financial crisis. Hence, banks’ capital payments and especially the payment of 
interest operated as sources of contraction of the monetary base in 2004. In 2005, the Central 
Bank launched a program allowing the acceleration of banks’ debt amortizations, reinforcing 
this contractionary mechanism.  
The Treasury also helped to absorb the “excess” of monetary expansion caused by the Central 
Bank’s interventions in the FX market. While in 2002 a net flow of financing to the Treasury 
was observed, from the beginning of 2003 and especially in 2004 the transactions between the 
Treasury and the Central Bank operated as a source of contraction of the monetary base. 
Purchases of international reserves with the proceeds of the fiscal surplus gave place to a 
monthly average monetary contraction of $543 million in 2004. The main purpose of these 
operations was to continue the servicing of the debt with the multilateral financial institutions. 
However, the Treasury also intervened in the exchange market with the explicit purpose of 
preserving the real exchange rate level and to help management of the monetary base. The 
government, through the Banco Nación, intervened actively in the FX market. These 
operations started in 2002 and gradually expanded afterwards, thus becoming an important 
policy instrument. In effect, during the first half of 2005 the Treasury bought an average of 
US$535 million per month. 
Despite the success in accomplishing the exchange rate and monetary targets during 2003 and 
2004, the economic evolution along 2005 has made it evident that the government started to 
face increasing difficulties in managing the monetary and exchange rate policies. In particular, 
the inflation rate gradually accelerated, up to a level of 12% at the end of the year (see Figure 
2.2). Many analysts, including IMF staff, suggest that controlling inflation and managing the 
exchange rate are incompatible goals. As the well-known impossible trinity or trilemma 
postulates, in a country integrated with the international financial market the government 
cannot simultaneously conduct an active monetary management and determine the exchange 
rate. In the view of the mentioned analysts, the Central Bank should have focused more 
exclusively on price stability, by raising interest rates, and let the peso appreciate. 
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The government has refused to follow these recommendations. So, in order to soften the 
appreciation pressures in the FX market and thus alleviate the central bank’s intervention 
needs, controls on the capital account were introduced in June 2005. Basically, the new 
measures established that all capital inflows — excluding the issuing of new private and public 
debt, international trade financing, and foreign direct investment — would be subject to a 30% 
unremunerated reserve requirement for at least 365 days.19 This strategy was inspired by the 
capital controls applied by Chile in the 90’s and that country’s attempts to reduce short-term 
capital inflows. However, the controls left open ways to avoid the reserve requirements. There 
has been no evidence of a reduction in the supply of dollars in the FX market after the 
measures were implemented. Local analysts believe that controls are ineffective and even the 
authorities do not reject the idea that they were introduced more as a signal of the official 
willingness to maintaining the SCRER strategy rather than as an effective control mechanism. 
For instance, capital inflows can easily circumvent the reserve requirement by operating 
through the stock exchange market (by buying domestic assets abroad and selling them in the 
local market). 
                                                 
19 See Borzel (2005) for details. 
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3. A Macroeconomic Policy Regime with a SCRER as an 
Intermediate Target 20 
As a way of drawing useful lessons from the experience analyzed in the previous section, we 
present in this section the basic features of a macroeconomic policy regime with a SCRER as 
an intermediate target. We are interested in delineating a macroeconomic policy regime not 
only focused [mainly] on employment and economic growth, but also capable of performing 
precautionary functions against crises and macroeconomic instability. It must be consistent 
with the financial globalization context – it is neither possible nor desirable to completely close 
the economy to capital flows – and its precautionary functions must thoroughly take into 
account the volatility of the capital flows. 
It is quite clear that the preservation of a SCRER policy focuses on the balance of payments 
and then performs precautionary functions against unsustainable current account and external 
debt trends. The effects of the SCRER strategy on employment and growth objectives, on the 
other hand, are more open to debate. In our view, the preservation of a SCRER plays a central 
role in the promotion of employment and economic growth. We do not have enough space in 
this article to fully justify it, but a brief explanation deserves to be presented.21  
The real exchange rate affects employment through three different channels. The first is the 
macroeconomic channel, which results from the role played by the real exchange rate in the 
determination of the real economic activity and employment levels in the short run. Putting 
aside immediate contractionary effects of devaluation, a competitive real exchange rate leads to 
higher net exports and consequently to higher demand on local activities and higher levels of 
output and employment. 
The second is the development channel. This channel results from the influence of the real 
exchange rate on economic growth and consequently on the speed of new jobs creation. A 
competitive real exchange rate involves the distortion of domestic relative prices in favour of 
tradable activities against non-tradable activities: the combination of higher protection to local 
activities that compete with imports with a higher competitiveness of export activities. 
Consequently, the real exchange rate affects the employment growth rate in the long run 
because of its influence on the rate of output growth through the incentive to invest in 
tradable activities, which accelerates productivity growth and generates positive externalities in 
other sectors. 
The third is the channel of labour intensity. This channel refers to the influence of the real 
exchange rate on the labour intensity of the economic processes: i.e. the influence of the real 
exchange rate on higher job generation, given a certain activity level or output growth rate. A 
competitive real exchange rate increases the labour intensity of output, mainly in the tradable 
                                                 
20 This section draws on Frenkel (2005).  
21 For a detailed presentation of the growth and employment roles of the SCRER see Frenkel (2004b) and Frenkel 
and Taylor (2005). 
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sector – but also in the non-tradable sector. This channel is singularly relevant in countries 
where most capital goods are imported, as is the case in Latin America.22 
Certainly, to reach and to sustain a SCRER do not exhaust the set of policy objectives. The 
objective of inflation control must also be added, as well as the objective of reaching the 
highest growth rate consistent with the available resources. The highest feasible growth rate 
and the competitive real exchange rate complement the objective of employment growth. 
Thus, the set of objectives that the macroeconomic policies must follow in this regime is 
completed.  
However, as the recent macroeconomic evolution in Argentina illustrates, there could be a 
conflict between the objectives The intermediate target and the objective of controlling 
inflation put the priorities in order and set the frame of restrictions of the exchange rate, 
monetary and fiscal policies. There is no segmentation of objectives and instruments in the 
proposed regime as long as the policies are formulated as a whole so as to guarantee the 
consistency of the intermediate target and the objectives. The demands that the simultaneous 
achievement of the real exchange rate target and inflation control imposed on fiscal and 
monetary policies warrant that the latter carry out preventive functions against undesirable 
trends – recessive or expansionary – in the financial sector and on aggregate demand.  
In what follows, we argue in favor of our policy proposal in a positive way, by showing that it 
is viable and manageable. Although the presentation is in part based on the Argentine 
experience discussed in the previous section, it is not tied to the specific recent characteristics 
of the Argentine monetary and financial system but is suited to more general contexts. Before 
beginning with the presentation of the proposal, it is worth taking into explicit account the 
orthodox objections, because of the weight these ideas have in the academic mainstream, the 
IFIs, and many government officers. The confrontation with such views will contribute to the 
presentation and defense of the proposed regime. In order to do so, we present first the 
orthodox arguments against RER targeting. Then, we present the exchange rate and monetary 
policy components of the regime and discuss the orthodox objections. 
3.1 The Orthodox Arguments Against RER Targeting 
It is worth mentioning in the first place that a SCRER target does not attract too much 
criticism by itself. Few people in both mainstream and heterodox thinking deny the beneficial 
aspects of stable and predictable relative prices and the positive development role of 
competitive exchange rates (Frenkel, 2004b). In some cases, welfare arguments against public 
intervention in the FX market are raised. But the idea that the free market optimally 
determines the exchange rate and the argument that the public sector has no informational 
advantage over the private sector are not very appealing concepts in the specialized discussion 
over exchange rate regimes and policies. The apparent volatility of capital flows, and the 
instability and unpredictability of free-floating exchange rates, greatly lessen the relevance of 
those ideas (Frankel and Rose, 1995). Moreover, the indeterminacy and unpredictability of a 
free-floating exchange rate are precisely the deeper foundations of both the need for managing 
the exchange rate and the government’s ability to do it (Blecker, 2005; Taylor, 2004, ch. 10). 
                                                 
22 A formal model and empirical evidence are presented in Frenkel and Ros (2005). 
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This is particularly true in countries in which the real exchange rate plays a crucial role in 
economic performance. 
Given the lack of theoretical foundations and empirical evidence on the RER determination in 
the short and medium run (Blecker, 2005; Wollmershäuser 2003, chapter 3), the orthodox 
objections that are relevant for economic policy formulations are based on the so-called 
impossible trinity argument or the trilemma.23 It says that it is impossible for a country to 
simultaneously maintain free capital flows, active monetary policy, and an ability to control the 
exchange rate. One of these features must necessarily be given up. As we already mentioned, 
this is the principal objection raised by the critics of the monetary and exchange rate policies 
conducted in Argentina during the post-convertibility period. 
The impossible trinity is essentially a normative argument, logically derived from the Mundell-
Fleming model. As a general conjecture valid in every circumstance, the trilemma is obviously 
false. The conclusion that a central bank cannot determine both the domestic interest rate (or 
determine the monetary base) and the exchange rate with free capital flows (provided that 
domestic and foreign financial assets are not perfect substitutes) critically depends on the 
assumption that the central bank does not (cannot) implement changes in the composition of 
its own portfolio (the assets and liabilities of the central bank) in compensation for the changes 
in the domestic portfolio caused by private capital flows (Lavoie, 2001 and Taylor, 2004; 
chapter 10). The hypothesis is clearly not valid in many cases. For instance, in a developed 
country, a central bank holding a substantial amount of foreign and domestic assets and able to 
easily buy or sell foreign and domestic assets in the local and international markets (e.g. the US 
Federal Reserve), can normally perform the mentioned compensatory operations.  
Developed countries’ central banks other than the US Federal Reserve enjoy similar policy 
degrees of freedom, although they differ in cases of capital inflows and outflows. The degrees 
of freedom in compensating for capital inflows are higher because in this case the central bank 
has practically an unlimited capacity of selling government bonds or issuing central bank 
papers in the domestic market – although the operation’s fiscal or quasi-fiscal costs have to be 
taken into account – (Bofinger and Wollmershäuser, 2003). On the other hand, the 
compensation of capital outflows is more limited because it could be constrained by the stock 
of foreign reserves or by a limit in the amount of bonds that the central bank can sell in the 
international market.  
So, the trilemma is false as an assertion valid in every circumstance. But even developed 
countries’ central banks cannot always perform the compensatory operations. For instance, the 
asymmetry between inflows and outflows points to that limitation. We can imagine that even 
the US Federal Reserve – hypothetically pursuing both exchange rate and interest rate targets – 
could be forced to devalue the dollar or raise the interest rate if confronted with huge capital 
outflows.  
With respect to the ability to perform operations intended to compensate for the effects of 
capital flows, the central banks of emerging market economies – developing countries open to 
capital flows – generally have fewer degrees of freedom than central banks in developed 
                                                 
23 For a recent presentation see Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2004). 
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countries. One reason for that difference is that in developing countries the amount of central 
bank assets  (i.e. foreign reserves and domestic assets) and the size of the domestic financial 
market – in a broad sense, including money and bank liabilities, as well as other financial assets 
– are relatively small vis-à-vis the size of capital flows. In Argentina, as well as in other Latin-
American countries, it should also be considered that the opening of the capital account in 
many cases has been implemented as part of structural reforms and stabilization policy 
packages, after financial and external crisis and/or high inflation periods that caused the 
shrinking of both the domestic financial market and the assets and foreign reserves of the 
central banks (Frenkel 2002, 2003a).24  
The objections raised by the orthodoxy in the discussion of RER targeting policy in developing 
countries have the local financial markets as its implicit setting. So, although the objections are 
incorrectly based on the trilemma, they point to true problems in the management of exchange 
rate and monetary policies posed by an open capital account in the financial globalization 
context. The objections point to the implementation difficulties that exchange rate and 
monetary policies confront in such a setting.  
As was presented in the Argentine debate, one way to express the orthodox argument is the 
following: Targeting the exchange rate implies a central bank’s intervening in the exchange rate 
market. In doing so, it is argued, the central bank loses its ability to control the money supply. 
So, targeting the exchange rate and controlling the money supply can be simultaneously 
pursued only if capital flows are regulated (the trilemma). However, the regulation of capital 
flows is undesirable and probably ineffective, because the private sector’s innovative capacity is 
greater than the public sector’s regulatory ability. The orthodox conclusion is that central banks 
have to avoid intervening in the exchange market.  
Another way to reach the same conclusion is by focusing the argument on controlling inflation 
(as was also presented in the Argentine debate). If the interventions in the FX market target 
the RER (instead of the nominal exchange rate), no nominal anchor remains for the public to 
configure inflationary expectations. Since the central bank cannot control the money supply, 
the inflation rate is completely out of control.  
As we mentioned above, these orthodox arguments do not involve logical necessity. But they 
actually point to practical implementation possibilities. Leaving aside institutional constraints 
on the central bank’s ability to perform compensatory operations, the practical possibilities 
depend on the magnitudes of the quantities involved. For instance, central bank exchange 
interventions are a source of money creation, but central banks have other instruments to 
control money supply. The  central bank’s ability to control the money supply depends on the 
size of the intervention vis-à-vis the practical limits of sterilization and other compensatory 
instruments.  
On the other hand, the size of the central bank’s intervention depends on the magnitude of 
excess supply or demand of international currency in the exchange market. International 
                                                 
24 We should emphasize that our discussion is mainly focused on the problems posed by capital inflows. It should 
be mentioned that most of the discussion about the management of exchange rate and monetary policy in a 
context of capital mobility is centered on capital outflows, while capital inflows get much less attention. See for 
instance Canales-Kriljenko (2003) and Canales-Kriljenko, Guinaraes and Karacadag (2003). 
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currency flows depend on the capital flow volume. The flows also depend on exchange rate 
expectations and consequently can be influenced by the monetary authority’s behaviour and 
signals. 
Also the ability to control capital flows is a matter of degree. Some capital flows are easier to 
regulate than others. Regulations do not need to be implemented once and for all; they may be 
implemented only in certain periods or can be made contingent to transitory circumstances. 
Besides, it is simply not true that capital flow regulations are always ineffective. 
The degrees of freedom of a SCRER-targeting policy is a practical matter that has to be 
assessed in each case, taking into account the context and circumstances of the policy 
implementation. We will go beyond the general considerations and discuss more in depth the 
orthodox objections while presenting our exchange and monetary policy proposals.  
3.2 The Exchange Rate Policy 
In our proposal, central bank interventions in the FX market are intended to maintain a 
SCRER. The main objective is to signal the stability of the RER in the medium and long term. 
The emergence of appreciation trends should be avoided for two reasons. First, it is to avoid 
self-fulfilling bubbles that increase the monetary “costs” of buying interventions. Second, the 
effects of expected trends in the RER are not symmetrical. Some countries have experienced 
long, appreciating RER periods that harmed the profitability of tradable activities, and made 
many of them non-viable and forced many firms to close. Investment in tradable sectors is 
mostly irreversible. Consequently, there are reasons to give high weight to the appreciation 
risk. Reduction of the perceived risk of appreciation is crucial in order to provide incentives for 
investment and employment in tradable activities.  
The preservation of RER stability does not mean short-run indexation of the nominal 
exchange rate to domestic prices. The flexibility and advantages of a floating nominal exchange 
rate in the short run should also be preserved. So, central bank interventions in the market 
have to achieve two conflicting targets: they have to prevent the formation of RER 
appreciation expectations and they have to allow the nominal exchange rate to float in order to 
remove incentives for short-term speculative capital flows. The interval of interventions has to 
be narrow enough to perform the first function and wide enough to perform the second.  
The so called “crawling-bands” policy rule – implemented in Chile in the early nineties – 
attempts the conciliation of the two mentioned targets by issuing long term RER stability 
signals while preserving short term nominal rate uncertainty.25 Its implementation is possible, 
but recent experiences of exchange rate rules’ leading to disasters have surely impaired the 
credibility of any exchange rule. Taking recent histories into account, it seems better to avoid 
rules announcements and commitments and to deliver signals in implicit ways, throughout the 
central bank interventions in the market. Nevertheless, in order to contribute to the 
expectations formation, it is important that the central bank and the government make clear 
                                                 
25 This is similar to “the BBC rules” proposed by John Williamson (2000). BBC stands for: band, basket and 
crawl. 
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the important role given to the competitive RER in the country’s development strategy, even if 
it does not imply any formal commitment.  
The exchange market behaves like an asset market. Buying and selling decisions are mostly 
based on expectations. If the central bank interventions and signals stabilize expectations 
around the stable RER – a necessary condition for which are the consistency of monetary and 
fiscal policies and the robustness of the external sector accounts – then market forces by 
themselves will tend to stabilize the rate. The monetary “costs” of central bank interventions 
will be lower and fewer interventions will be required. For this reason, a central bank’s market 
interventions should be firm, in order to clearly show to the market the willingness and 
strength of the monetary authority.  
3.3 The Exchange Market and Capital Flows 
It is implicit in the above presentation of the exchange-rate policy that the buying and selling 
flows of international currency are manageable. This means that the central bank can manage 
the compensation of the money contraction or expansion resulting from the exchange market 
interventions, in order to maintain the money stock fluctuations between tolerable limits. 
In the discussion of this issue, it is convenient to analyze situations of excess supply and 
demand of international currency separately. 
The orthodox argument against RER targeting focuses mainly on an excess supply situation 
that makes exchange interventions unmanageable.26 If capital inflows are massive – up to the 
point to make monetary policy unmanageable – the orthodox argument is right. But in this 
situation it would make little sense to risk macroeconomic stability in order to preserve the full 
openness principle of capital accounts. The preservation of the macroeconomic policy regime 
requires in this case active capital account regulations, intended to restrict capital inflows and 
facilitate the management of exchange and monetary policies. There is a menu of measures 
able to accomplish this function.27  The orthodox argument about the lack of effectiveness of 
restraining policies is not true. They do not work perfectly well, but they contribute to soften 
capital inflows in a booming situation. The need for restraining policies is not permanent: they 
have to do their job only in a booming phase, and we now know well that booming phases do 
not last forever.  
                                                 
26 In conditions of excess supply of international currency at the targeted exchange rate, the increase in the 
monetary base resulting from the intervention in the exchange market can be fully sterilized without altering the 
interest rate. This is true at any point in time. But the possibility of a permanent full sterilization of the excess 
supply in the exchange market depends on the levels of domestic and international interest rates and on the 
trajectory of the nominal exchange rate. The continuous sterilization policy must satisfy a temporal consistency 
condition: the central bank’s liabilities should not follow an explosive path. Given the international interest rate 
earned by the reserves and the rate of nominal devaluation, the temporal consistency condition sets a roof for 
the domestic interest rate. Continuous sterilization, as in China, is only possible if domestic interest rates are 
“low.”     
27 For instance, measures like those applied by Chile and Colombia in the nineties did not completely restrain 
capital inflows, but affected their amount and composition (see Ocampo and Tovar, 2003; and Le Fort and 
Lehman, 2003). See also Palma (2002) and Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2003). 
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Let us consider the situation of excess demand. There is an excess demand for international 
currency that is not manageable with the normal exchange and monetary policies. In order to 
sustain the exchange rate, the market intervention would cause an excessive monetary 
contraction and a rise in the interest rate — triggering a recession. The defence of some 
nominal exchange rate may risk a speculative attack on the central bank’s reserves. The 
situation has similarities with a crisis of a fixed exchange rate regime. But there is also an 
important difference. If there are no fundamental reasons28 to expect devaluation – generated, 
for instance, by an important balance of payments deficit expectation – then fiscal and 
monetary policies are consistent with the targeted RER, and inflation is under control. In this 
case, the macroeconomic policy regime should be preserved. This would only be possible in a 
situation if exchange controls and restrictions on capital outflows were imposed. If, as we 
assume, there are no fundamental reasons to induce excess demand for international currency, 
there is no need for the controls and regulations to last for long. As we described in the section 
2, Argentina successfully managed exchange controls and capital outflow regulations in mid-
2002, when the run into foreign currency was mainly caused by a self-fulfilling bubble in the 
exchange rate. The measures were gradually softened when the buying pressure in the 
exchange market diminished.29  
The orthodoxy and the IMF reject capital outflow regulations with particular emphasis. There 
is an implicit argument lying behind this rejection that is deeply rooted in the orthodox view 
about the way markets operate. A priori, this view does not consider the possibility of a foreign 
currency run that is not motivated by fundamental reasons. In such a situation, there should be 
fundamental reasons explaining the agents’ behaviour, even if the authorities and the IMF 
officials do not detect those reasons. But it is evident that runs without fundamental 
motivation can take place. For instance, the bankruptcy of an important bank or the 
uncertainty of a political crisis may trigger runs. The financial globalization context has 
broadened the possibilities of capital outflows triggered by international contagion. 
3.4 Monetary Policy 
In a SCRER macroeconomic regime, monetary policy need no longer be exclusively focused on 
inflation. Monetary policy has to be simultaneously focused on RER, the control of inflation, and 
the activity level. 
To propose a monetary policy with multiple objectives conflicts with orthodox and IMF 
orientations, according to which inflation should be the only objective of monetary policy 
(with a preference for inflation targeting) and it has to be managed by an independent central 
bank with a narrow mandate for inflation control.  
The technical orthodox reason for the independence of the central bank is to enhance the 
credibility of monetary policy. To prescribe an exclusive focus on inflation for monetary policy 
is not a direct consequence of the orthodox impossibility argument, discussed above. With 
controls on capital flow, or in a pure floating exchange rate setting, the trilemma says that an 
                                                 
28 “Fundamental reasons” or “fundamentals” refer to the information about the economic performance as seen 
from the conventional perspective prevailing in the market. 
29 On other experiences see Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2003). 
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independent monetary policy is viable. Why should it be exclusively focused on inflation? 
There are different technical arguments justifying an exclusive focus on inflation, but in 
essence they are all based on the “non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” (NAIRU) 
hypothesis.  
Beyond the orthodox technical arguments, within the foundations of an exclusive focus on 
inflation for monetary policy and a narrow mandate for an independent central bank, lies a 
deep distrust about the ability of governments to take care of inflation and to submit 
themselves to monetary discipline. 
It may be true that an independent central bank with a narrow mandate enjoys more credibility 
in the eyes of the average market opinion. But the cost of reaching the highest credibility in 
shaping inflationary expectations is the loss of monetary policy as an instrument for attaining 
other targets, such as the RER and the activity level.  
So, in the proposed regime, the central bank should have a broader mandate. Monetary policy 
has to be formulated jointly with the rest of macroeconomic policies and the implementation 
should be frequently coordinated. In any case, central bank independence should help 
strengthen the credibility of both exchange rate and monetary policies. 
Let us add two other comments before focusing on the management of monetary policy, both 
related to inflation. The first point is to show that the proposed regime performs a 
preventative role with respect to inflation acceleration. In Latin America and in other 
developing economies, the exchange rate is the main transmission mechanism of monetary 
impulses to the inflation rate.30  The RER target precisely encourages the central bank to 
implement monetary policies that avoid fluctuations that affect primarily the nominal exchange 
rate and cause RER fluctuations. In contrast, for the same reason, an exclusive inflation focus 
of monetary policy generates incentives towards RER appreciation.  
The second comment relates to the contexts in which the proposed regime would be 
implemented. For instance, in Latin America, as in other parts of the world, we are fortunately 
far from the high inflation contexts that justified the primacy of inflation controls. These 
contexts helped give inflation control a hierarchy similar to the other objectives of monetary 
policy.   
Let us now turn our attention to monetary policy management. This refers to the normal 
operations that the monetary authority can implement to compensate for the interventions in 
the exchange market, if necessary. Out of the extreme situations discussed above, the monetary 
authority can manage different instruments for that purpose. 
The most common is the sterilization operations. They consist in the selling of the public 
sector’s or central bank’s papers with the objective of money absorption. They imply a 
financial cost to the treasury or the central bank, proportional to the difference between the 
interest rate of those papers and the interest rate earned by the central bank’s international 
reserves. But the net result of the sterilization operation also depends on the effects of prices 
                                                 
30 This applies not only in developing countries, but also in developed countries such as the United Kingdom. See 
UK Parliament (1999). 
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and interest and exchange rates on the values of the assets and liabilities of the central bank. 
For instance, if the nominal exchange rate increases at a rate equal to the difference between 
the local and the international interest rates, the net result is nil31 (Bofinger and 
Wollmershäuser, 2003).  
In more general terms, the set of instruments that the central bank can manage depends, on 
the one hand, on the particular institutional setting and, on the other hand, on the relative size 
– vis-à-vis the size of the financial market – and structure of the central bank’s assets and 
liabilities. For instance, a central bank in possession of a significant amount of bank debt can 
manage it as an instrument for monetary control (Lavoie, 2001). Public sector deposits in the 
central bank can be used in analogous way. Some prudential regulations can be oriented to the 
same target, particularly when the problem is to constrain money expansion. For instance, the 
central bank can raise the cash requirements of the banking system. Higher cash requirements 
imply a lower expansionary effect of the central bank’s basic operations in the exchange 
market. Other prudential regulations can be directly focused on smoothing the selling pressure 
in the exchange market. For instance, if local banks are not allowed to back credits in domestic 
currency with liabilities in international currency and if credits in international currency are 
limited, there are fewer incentives to the banks’ procuring international funding.  
The existence of public banks with a significant share of the financial market can facilitate the 
monetary management. The public banks can be coordinated in order to help the central bank 
in both the management of the liquidity and the exchange market interventions. 
Central bank operations oriented to neutralize or attenuate the monetary expansion resulting 
from its exchange market intervention may have incremental effects on the interest rates. On 
occasion, those effects may constitute an additional incentive to capital inflows, frustrating the 
main purpose of the sterilization operations. In this regard, the effectiveness of sterilization 
policies obviously depends on the magnitude of selling pressure in the exchange market. If the 
above-mentioned operations do not suffice – given the size of the supply in the exchange 
market – they should be reinforced with restrictions on capital inflows, or other measures 
intended to directly reduce the selling pressure in the exchange market.32  
The management of these instruments should allow the central bank to keep money expansion 
under control. But there is another crucial problem: the demand for money is usually highly 
uncertain. This is particularly the case in developing countries. In these cases the evolution of 
money demand may be particularly uncertain because money demand is growing at an 
unknown pace along with the development process. Other situations in which the demand for 
money is highly uncertain are not unusual in developing countries (for instance, when a 
remonetization process is taking place in a recuperation phase following a crisis, as happened 
recently in Argentina). 
It should be emphasised that the same problem also affects monetary policy that focuses 
exclusively on inflation and is implemented by quantitative money targets. This uncertainty 
                                                 
31 The sterilization cost should not necessarily be zero to allow the permanent implementation of sterilization. It 
can be positive, but the cumulative cost has to be bounded and manageable. See footnote 28. 
32 For instance, a tax on foreign currency sales collected by the bank system and reimbursed to exporters 
preserves the exchange rate for exports while removing incentives for other foreign currency inflows. 
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about money demand is precisely the main motivation to abandon the traditional money 
quantities policies and adopt fashionable inflation-targeting policies.33  
In the proposed regime, monetary policy has multiple objectives, as was mentioned above, and 
it falls victim to the same uncertainty problem suffered by other monetary policies. So, in 
accomplishing its ample mandate, the central bank requires frequent assessments of the 
country’s macroeconomic evolution and enough policy discretion – in opposition to rigid rules 
– to operate throughout all its instruments. Even if it is an independent institution, the central 
bank’s measures should be coordinated with other governmental policies. 
                                                 
33 In this sense, inflation targeting is a way to amplify the central bank’s discretion. More discretion is needed 
because the uncertainty problem makes quantitative money targets impractical. We also believe that the central 
bank should have enough degrees of freedom to pursue its targets. But we question inflation-targeting because 
of its exclusive focus on inflation.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper we analyzed the macroeconomic evolution of Argentina after the convertibility 
collapse in the last days of 2001. We showed that after the devaluation and the partial default 
on public debt, the economy continued shrinking at a high speed, in as much as it happened in 
the end of the convertibility regime. However, the contractionary trend was short-lived. Since 
the second quarter of 2002, the economy started a rapid recuperation process. By mid-2005, 
GDP had surpassed the peak reached in 1998, and the growing trend persisted at a high rate.  
Our analysis implicitly questions the explanation that attributes the principal factor of the 
economic recovery to the favorable external context. In this interpretation, the recovery would 
be taking place in spite of what is seen from this perspective as an economic policy full of 
mistakes and omissions. Although the contribution of external factors to the recovery has been 
undeniable (in particular some commodities’ high prices) the fact that the substantial part of 
the expansion’s dynamism derives from sources of internal demand weakens that 
interpretation. In our view the main factor lies in a pragmatic macroeconomic policy, aimed 
first at stabilizing domestic financial markets and recuperating the basic macroeconomic 
equilibria, and then at preserving a SCRER, managing adequately the monetary policy and 
reinforcing tax collection. The exchange rate policy provided incentives to the tradable sector, 
promoting the expansion of its production, employment, and investment.  
In spite of the apparent success of the Argentine strategy, the SCRER policy conflicts with the 
conventional wisdom. The combination of a fully opened capital account, a pure floating 
exchange rate, and an inflation-targeting monetary policy is the set of policies recommended in 
Argentina and other Latin American countries by the IMF and the orthodoxy. In our view, this 
combination has two important negative attributes. Firstly, the volatility of capital flows is 
transmitted through the volatility of nominal and real exchange rates and relative prices. 
Secondly, the targeting of inflation sets a bias towards exchange rate appreciation, with 
negative effects on employment and growth.  
We have shown that an alternative macroeconomic policy regime focused simultaneously on 
employment, inflation, and growth with a SCRER as an intermediate target is viable and 
manageable. The apparent volatility of capital flows, and the instability and unpredictability of 
free-floating exchange rates, all greatly lessen the validity of the ‘equilibrium’ exchange rate 
notion. Given the lack of theoretical foundations and empirical evidence on the RER 
determination in the short and medium run, the orthodox objections against RER-targeting 
that are relevant for formulating economic policies are based on the impossible trinity or 
trilemma argument. The trilemma is false as a general assertion valid in all circumstances. 
Particularly, in a capital inflows context the central bank should not confront severe difficulties 
in simultaneously managing the exchange rate and the short run domestic interest rate (or the 
monetary base). Those targets can be attained by implementing compensatory operations in 
the money market and regulations on the domestic financial system, reinforced by regulations 
on the capital flows. 
Argentina’s Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies after the Convertibility Regime Collapse • 36 
 
References 
Blecker, R. (2005): “Financial globalization, exchange rates and international trade”, in Gerald 
Epstein (Ed.), “Financialization in the World Economy”, Northampton, MA and 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp.183-209. 
Bofinger P. and Wollmershäuser T., (2003): “Managed Floating as a Monetary Policy Strategy”, 
mimeo. 
Borzel, M (2005): “El manejo de la cuenta capital: enseñanzas recientes y desafíos para 
Argentina”, Centro de Economía y Finanzas par el desarrollo de la Argentina, mimeo.  
Canales-Kriljenko, J. I. (2003): “Foreign Exchange Intervention in Developing and Transition 
Economies: Results of a Survey”, IMF Working Papers 03/95. 
Canales-Kriljenko, J. I., Guimaraes, R. and Karacadag, C. (2003): “Official Intervention in the 
Foreign Exchange Market: Elements of Best Practice”, IMF Working Papers 03/152. 
Damill, M. (2000): “El balance de pagos y la deuda externa pública bajo la convertibilidad”, 
Boletín Informativo Techint Nº 303, Buenos Aires. 
Damill, M. and R Frenkel (2003): “Argentina: Macroeconomic Performance and Crisis”, in: 
Ffrench-Davis, R., D. Nayyar y J.E. Stiglitz (eds.), “Stabilization Policies for Growth 
and Development”, Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Macroeconomics Policy Task Force, 
New York, forthcoming.  
Damill, M., R. Frenkel and R. Maurizio (2002): “Argentina: A decade of currency board. An 
analysis of growth, employment and income distribution”, Employment Paper 
2002/42, International Labour Office, Geneva. 
Damill, M., R. Frenkel and R. Maurizio (2003): “Políticas macroeconómicas y vulnerabilidad 
social. La Argentina en los años noventa”, Serie Financiamiento del Desarrollo Nº 135, 
ECLAC, Santiago de Chile. 
Epstein, G., I. Grabel, and K.S. Jomo (2003): “Capital Management Techniques in Developing 
Countries: An Assessment of Experiences from the 1990s and Lessons for the Future,” 
PERI Working Paper Number 56, University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA. 
Frankel, J. and Rose, A.K. (1995): “Empirical Research on Nominal Exchange Rates.” In G. 
M. Grossman and K. Rogoff (eds.), Handbook of International Economics, vol. III. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1689-1709. 
Frenkel, R. (1983): “Mercado financiero, Expectativas Cambiarias y Movimientos de Capital”, 
El Trimestre Económico, Vol. L (4), Nº 200, México. 
Frenkel, R. (2002): “Capital Market Liberalization and Economic Performance in Latin 
America.” In J. Eatwell and L. Taylor (eds.) International Capital Markets. Systems in 
Transition. Oxford University Press Inc., New York, pp. 255-276. 
Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2007 • 37 
 
Frenkel, R. (2003a): “Globalization and Financial Crises in Latin America”, CEPAL Review Nº 
80, ECLAC, Santiago, Chile. 
Frenkel, R. (2003b): “From the boom in capital inflows to financial traps”, Initiative for Policy 
Dialogue (IPD) Capital Market Liberalization Task Force, Barcelona, Spain, June 2-3, 
2003. 
Frenkel, R. (2004ª): “Remuneraciones, Mercado de trabajo y política salarial en la recuperación. 
Argentina 2003-2004”, paper prepared for the ILO/ Argentine Labor Ministry project 
“Enfrentando los retos del trabajo decente”.  
Frenkel, R. (2004b): “Real exchange rate and employment in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico”, paper for The G-24, Washington DC, September. 
Frenkel, R. (2005):”An Alternative to Inflation Targeting in Latin America: Macroeconomic 
Policies focused on Employment”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics (forthcoming). 
Frenkel, R. and Ros, J. (2005): “Unemployment and the Real Exchange Rate in Latin 
America.” (mimeo). World Development (forthcoming). 
Frenkel, R. and Taylor, L. (2005): “Real Exchange Rate, Monetary Policy, and Employment.” 
Paper prepared for the High-Level United Nations Development Conference, New 
York, 14-15 March, 2005. 
Lavoie, M. (2001): “The reflux mechanism in the open economy “, in: Rochon L. P. and M. 
Vernengo (eds.), “Credit, Interest Rates and the Open Economy: Essays on 
Horizontalism”, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Le Fort, G. and S. Lehmann (2003): “The unremunerated reserve requirement and net capital 
flows: Chile in the 1990s”, CEPAL Review Nº 81, ECLAC, Santiago, Chile. 
Minsky, H. P. (1975): “John Maynard Keynes”, Columbia University Press, New York. 
Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J.C., and Taylor, A. (2004): “Tradeoffs among Exchange Rates, 
Monetary Policies and Capital Mobility.” NBER Working Paper No 10396. 
Ocampo, J. A. and C. E. Tovar (2003): “Colombia’s experience with reserve requirements on 
capital inflows”, CEPAL Review Nº 81, ECLAC, Santiago, Chile. 
Palma, G. (2002): “The three routes to financial crisis: The need for capital controls”, in: Eatwell, 
J. and L. Taylor (eds.), “International Capital Markets. Systems in Transition”, Oxford 
University Press Inc., New York, pp. 297-338 
Taylor, L. (1991): “Income Distribution, Inflation, and Growth”, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Taylor, L. (1998): “Lax Public Sector and Destabilizing Private Sector: Origins of Capital 
Market Crises”, in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
International Monetary and Financial Issues for 1990s, vol. 10, New York. 
Argentina’s Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies after the Convertibility Regime Collapse • 38 
 
Taylor, L. (2004): “Reconstructing Macroeconomics. Structuralist Proposals and Critiques of 
the Mainstream”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
UK Parliament (1999): Report of the Select Committee on Monetary Policy Committee of the 
Bank of England 
(www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldselect/ldmon/96/9601.htm) 
Williamson, J. (1983): “The Open Economy and the World Economy”, Basic Books, New 
York. 
Williamson, J. (2000): “Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Markets: Reviving the 
Intermediate Option”, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C 
Wollmershäuser, T. (2003): “A Theory of Managed Floating”, Universität Würzburg, mimeo. 
Center for Economic and Policy Research, April 2007 • 39 
 
Chronological Appendix 
Dec. 1999 The Alianza between the Radical party and the Frepaso wins the presidential 
elections. Fernando De la Rúa takes office as President of Argentina with 
Carlos ‘Chacho’ Alvarez as Vice President. José Luis Machinea is appointed 
Minister of Economy. 
March 2000 The IMF Board approves a three-year stand-by arrangement with Argentina 
for an amount equivalent to US $7.2 billion to support the government’s 
2000-02 economic program.  
Oct. 1999 Vice President Carlos Álvarez resigns after De La Rúa promotes a minister 
suspected of corruption. The political crisis triggers a run on bank deposits 
and Central Bank reserves.  
Jan. 2001 The government achieves a financial shield (the so-called ‘blindaje’) of US$40 
billion with the cooperation of the IFIs, domestic banks, and the government 
of Spain to cover its debt services along 2001. Through this operation, the 
IMF approves an augmentation of the stand-by arrangement agreed in March 
2000 to about US $14 billion.  
March 2001 Minister Machinea resigns because of his inability to stop the increasing fiscal 
deficit. Ricardo Lopez Murphy is appointed Minister of Economy. Many 
Frepaso members of the cabinet resign in protest over Lopez Murphy’s fiscal 
austerity program proposal. The alliance between the Frepaso and the Radical 
party is almost broken and labor unions call for a strike. Domingo Cavallo 
replaces Lopez Murphy. 
May 2001 The IMF Board completes the third review of Argentina’s stand-by 
arrangement, giving a waiver for a fiscal deficit $1 billion higher than first 
agreed.  
June 2001 The government announces the completion of a ‘mega-swap’ of sovereign 
debt. The operation lessens the debt service burden until 2006 at the cost of 
increasing nominal debt and interest rates. 
July 2001 The situation of increasing fiscal unbalance and soaring interest rates forces 
the government to launch a ‘zero fiscal deficit’ plan. A 13%-reduction on 
expenditures is announced, including public salaries and benefits. 
Aug. 2001 The IMF announces an augmentation of the current stand-by arrangement by 
$8 billion. An initial disbursement of US $4 billion is used to restore Central 
Bank reserves, while another US $1 billion is used for fiscal purposes.  
Nov. 2001 The government launches a new voluntary debt swap for local bondholders. 
Banks, private pension funds, and insurance firms exchange their bond 
holdings of about US $42.0 billion for tax-secured loans.  
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Dec. 2001 Owing to the increasing bank runs and capital flight, the authorities introduce 
a deposit freeze (the so-called “corralito”) and foreign exchange controls. 
IMF suspends its support to Argentina’s economic program. Public 
demonstrations force Minister Cavallo and President De La Rúa to resign. 
Three interim presidents take office in two weeks; one of them (Adolfo 
Rodriguez Saá) announces a partial default on external debt.  
Jan. 2002 Eduardo Duhalde is elected President by the Legislative Assembly to 
conclude the remaining period of the de la Rúa presidency until December 
2003. Jorge Remes Lenicov is appointed Minister of Economy. The end of 
convertibility is officially announced and a dual exchange rate regime is 
introduced. 
Feb. 2002 The foreign exchange market is unified.  
The government decides an asymmetric “pesofication” of bank balance 
sheets (bank credits at $1/US$1, and deposits at $1.40/US$1). Banks would 
be compensated for the negative balance effect caused by the asymmetric 
“pesofication.” 
A rescheduling of banks obligations is also announced. All deposits other 
than sight deposits (“‘corralito”) are converted into time deposits with longer 
maturity (the so-called “corralón”).  
Apr. 2002 Export taxes on agricultural primary products are increased to 20–25%.  
The withdrawals from the “corralito” and the judicial injunctions 
(“amparos”) seriously affect bank system liquidity. Minister Remes Lenicov 
presents the so-called BONEX II plan to the Congress to convert 
compulsory reprogrammed time deposits into government bonds. The draft 
law is rejected and Minister Remes resigns. The Congress approves the “Ley 
Tapón” to ease the pressure from the “amparos.” The law modifies court 
procedures, and states that the depositors can only access the funds once the 
judicial process is over; in the meantime funds are deposited in an escrow 
account.  
Roberto Lavagna is appointed Minister of Economy. 
June 2002 The government applies additional exchange controls to stop the dollar 
boost. The minimum level of export proceeds to be surrendered to the 
Central Bank is lowered to US $1 million and to US $0.5 millions two weeks 
later. 
 A voluntary swap is opened to convert reprogrammed time deposits caught 
in the “corralón” into government bonds (BODEN). The offer achieves a 
25% level of acceptance. 
July 2002 It is decided to adjust most of the bank loans to individuals by a wage index 
(CVS). 
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A federal court declares the deposit freeze and pesofication unconstitutional. 
The government issues a decree suspending court- ordered withdrawals of 
frozen bank deposits for 120 business days. 
Sept. 2002 A second voluntary swap of government bonds for reprogrammed deposits 
is launched, with very little acceptance.  
New exchange controls are introduced in order to boost accumulation of 
international reserves and to control the value of the dollar. 
Dec. 2002 The authorities open the ‘corralito’; however time deposits (‘corralón’) 
remain frozen. 
Jan. 2003 An agreement with the IMF is reached. The new stand-by credit arrangement 
is designed to provide temporary financial support until a new administration 
takes office. The credit line would cover only capital payment obligations till 
August 2003. Among other subjects, Argentine authorities have to pursue a 
consolidated primary surplus of about 2.5% of GDP.  
The Central Bank decides to soften restrictions on foreign exchange 
operations: the exporters’ limit for foreign exchange surrender to the Central 
Bank is raised to US $1 million and the purchases of external financial 
interest and utilities are liberalized. 
March 2003 The government launches a third swap of sovereign bonds for frozen 
deposits in the “corralón.” The official offer achieves an important level of 
acceptance. 
May 2003 Nestor Kirchner becomes President. Roberto Lavagna remains as Minister of 
Economy.  
 The Central Bank introduces additional relaxations of the restrictions on 
foreign exchange operations: exporters have up to 90 days to surrender 
foreign currencies to the monetary authority.  
Sept. 2003 Minister Lavagna presents the first draft of the Argentine proposal of 
sovereign debt swap in the joint World Bank-IMF Annual Meeting at Dubai. 
Oct. 2003 A program is launched to facilitate banks’ re-payment of the Central Bank’s 
financial assistance during the financial crisis.  
Feb. 2004  Ministries of Finance from the G-7 urge Argentine authorities to accelerate 
sovereign debt restructuring and to negotiate with “good will.” 
June 2004 Minister Lavagna presents a more “friendly” sovereign debt restructuring 
proposal in Buenos Aires. The process of debt restructuring is intended to 
begin in September.  
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Jan. 2005 Argentine sovereign debt swap begins. The Congress passes a law forbidding 
any change in the offer.  
Feb. 2005 Argentine sovereign debt swap finishes. The level of acceptance reaches 
76.15% of the debt in default. The government expresses its satisfaction for 
the swap outcome: the operation leads to a reduction in the public debt stock 
by about US $67.3 billion. 
